sessed this intelligence, he would not have ordered the movement. I then had my flag in the Enterprise, one of the two carriers we had operating in the Pacific. The second was the Lexington, part of a Force under Rear Admiral Newton's command. The Saratoga, the third and only other carrier assigned to the Pacific Fleet, was on the West Coast of the United States, completing periodic overhaul and repair. We were sadly deficient in long-distance scouting planes. The only Army planes available were B-18s. These planes were slow, shortlegged, and unfitted for overseas scouting. There were not sufficient PBYs -Navy scouting planes and good, old, slow, and cumbersome work horses -to run a continuous 360˚ search without wearing out matériel and personnel. We were further handicapped by directives requiring the training of large quotas of personnel in these planes for service in the Atlantic. This, altogether with the transfer of the carrier Yorktown to the East Coast of the United States, was a tremendous drain on our already slim resources. Nevertheless, had the "Magic Messages" been known to us, there can be no doubt that a 360˚ search would have been ordered and maintained to the breaking point of materiel and personnel. I have always considered Admiral Kimmel and General Short to be splendid officers who were thrown to the wolves as scapegoats for something over which they had no control. They had to work with what they were given, both in equipment and information. They are our outstanding military martyrs. The article on the New York Daily News had very interesting comments on the police and intelligence reports, but our present concern centers in the Sorge confession and the secret Japanese police reports. Before his execution in early 1942*, Dr. Sorge made a complete 32,000-word confession of his activities to his Japanese captors. This confession was forwarded to the Pentagon in Washington by General MacArthur, so that the account of the Sorge activities are to be found in the secret files in our national capital in both the Sorge confession and the Japanese secret police documents. 
WILLIAM F. HALSEY

APPENDIX
Actually, the ships in Hawaii, during 1940 and 1941, with their crews at peacetime strengths, were hollow shells as far as readiness for all-out battle was concerned. There were two main reasons for this, viz: (1) the available men in peacetime have to be stationed and trained in those battle duties which demand a higher order of technical skill; (2) the lower-deck ammunition parties, and other lower-deck battle stations in the same category, are largely skeletonized in peacetime, because handling powder and shell from the magazines and shellrooms to the power hoists, which deliver the ammunition to the vicinity of the guns, requires physical endurance but very little skill, so that recruits can quickly be made proficient in those duties. This meant that the rate of fire required for success in battle could not possibly be met until the crews of these ships were raised to their war complements -a very long process, unless the ships retired to their West Coast mobilization ports, either upon the issuance of the Mobilization Order or of orders to augment the ships' crews to war-complement strengths. The number required by each type of ship to accomplish this was: battleships, 700 to 800; heavy cruisers, 350 to 400; light cruisers, 275 to 300; destroyers, 75 to 100. None of these considerations particularly affected the rate of anti-aircraft fire on December 7, 1941, because with the ships in harbor, the turret and broadside batteries could not possibly go into action, so that the crews for these guns could be used to augment the anti-aircraft am-munition parties. At sea, however, all batteries must be ready for instant action, whenever there is the slightest prospect of contact with the enemy, and that contingency must be considered ever-present in any active theatre of operations.
